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Standfirst: Health system resilience begins with measurement of critical capacities ahead 
of crisis.  
 
Introduction 
The 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic shone a harsh light on the health systems of 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.  While decades of domestic and international 
investment had contributed to substantial progress on the Millennium Development 
Goals, 1,2 national health systems remained weak and unable to cope with the epidemic.  
Routine care of the population also deteriorated during the outbreak. 1-4, Surveillance 
systems did not function effectively, allowing Ebola to spread within and between the 
countries. Global institutions were slow to respond to the crisis, squandering an 
opportunity to stem its course.5-7  
 
Since the Ebola epidemic, diverse panels of experts have pointed to political and 
technical deficiencies in multilateral organizations in tackling health crises.8-11 These 
reports have noted that the first line of defense against future pandemics is an effective 
national health system. They have also called for better measurement of public health 
capacity and investments to build resilient health systems—systems that can withstand 
health shocks while maintaining routine functions. 12 The issue of how global bodies can 
support countries in withstanding future health shocks is playing out now in the WHO 
Director General elections, with several candidates making health system resilience part 
of their election planks.   
 
Based on recent literature, this paper defines health system resilience as “the capacity of 
health actors, institutions, and populations to prepare for and effectively respond to 
crises; maintain core functions when a crisis hits; and, informed by lessons learned during 
the crisis, reorganize if conditions require it.”13 Health system resilience is relevant in all 
countries facing health shocks—whether sudden (Ebola, earthquakes, terror attacks, 
refugees), slower moving (new pathogens such as Zika becoming endemic or 
epidemiologic transition) or the more chronic ‘everyday’ shocks and stresses that 
characterize even times of seeming calm (drug shortages, loss of key health personnel, 
micro-outbreaks of endemic diseases).  Yet, while health system resilience has been 
defined and widely discussed, there is debate about whether the concept has something 
truly new to add to the discussion on health system strengthening, and how resilience can 
be best built and measured.  
 
In this paper, we argue that the concept of resilience adds substantial value to health 
systems, can be measured, and should be a national and international priority. We first 
discuss recent critiques of the concept of health system resilience to health system 
strengthening. We then briefly outline three case studies from Lebanon, Liberia, and 
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Indonesia that demonstrate how health systems have improved resilience in response to 
crisis.  Lastly, we propose measures of health system resilience for use by countries.   
 
As shown in Figure 1, resilient health systems—health systems that are equipped to 
respond to shocks—are aware, integrated, diverse, self-regulating, and adaptive. These 
features do not arise in a vacuum; they require a foundation of strong local and national 
leadership, a committed health workforce, sufficient health system infrastructure and 
global support. The last point is especially worth emphasizing: resilience is not self-
sufficiency.  Crises do not respect geopolitical boundaries and thus resilience requires 
thoughtful interconnectedness or “smart dependency.” 
The value and critiques of the concept of resilient health systems 
While the construct of resilience has been widely used in diverse fields, including 
ecology, engineering, and psychology, it is relatively new to health. 14-18 With a plethora 
of frameworks and catchphrases crowding the global health lexicon, there are legitimate 
questions about the value added by the concept of ‘resilient’ health systems. We identify 
three contributions of the concept of resilience to the health systems field:  
First, resilience emphasizes the functions health systems need (Figure 1) to respond and 
adapt to health shocks, introducing a dynamic dimension into more static health system 
models, such as the WHO’s building blocks framework.19 A rigidity of mission 
characterizes the operations of many health systems, whose ethos and organization is 
better suited to yesterday’s disease burden than tomorrow’s, focusing mostly on episodic 
care, unequipped to provide advanced care for infections, longitudinal care for a broad 
spectrum of chronic diseases, or emergency care needed to respond to the rising tide of 
injuries. Resilience demands flexibility in the functions and organization of the health 
system, which can help the system cope with surges in demand during crisis and adapt to 
changing epidemiology and population expectations of care. 
 
Second, the concept contributes useful new ideas to health systems from other sectors 
that have long thought about resilience. For example, other sectors have developed 
solutions for supply chains and logistics to respond to surges in demand that may be 
relevant.  Concepts such as cost-effective redundancy20 and slow-fast variables, 21 
commonplace in engineering or ecology could provide good models for the health 
system.  Building trust and promoting meaningful community engagement, have been 
systematically studied in other fields such as environmental sustainability and political 
science, but have not been well operationalized in health systems science.22-24 Resilience 
draws on complex systems notions identified as important in health systems but rarely 
acted upon, such as the interconnectedness of health and non-health actors and the 
importance of feedback loops.25 
Finally, the concept of resilience helps bridge disparate health and development agendas, 
such as Universal Health Coverage, the Global Health Security Agenda, and the 
Sustainable Development Goals thus lending fresh impetus to the need to invest in health 
systems. 26-29 It identifies the immediate and longer-term payoffs of well functioning, 
responsive, and adaptable health systems and highlights the unacceptable costs of 
inaction.  By containing outbreaks, returning to baseline function faster, and mitigating 
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other shocks, resilient health systems can contribute to economic stability—an example 
of a resilience dividend. 30 Conversely, inaction will result in lost lives, diminished 
livelihoods, and damaged economies in the affected country and globally—the latter on 
the order of US$60 billion each year from potential pandemics. 31 The recognition that 
health systems are the front line for dealing with the next big threat to global health 
security amplifies the urgency of health system strengthening and draws in new actors 
and ideas.  
 
This notwithstanding, the rising attention to resilience in global health has prompted 
several critiques of the concept.  One is that the concept of resilience is an imposed, 
technocratic solution that obscures the socioeconomic and political factors that lead to an 
inadequate response to shocks.  These factors may include unfavorable trade terms, weak 
citizen engagement, and chronic health system deficiencies. 32-35 This critique suggests 
that value judgments about what constitutes resilience for whom be made explicit. The 
latter point is particularly salient: ordinary individuals may lack power that precludes 
them from shaping the health system response or holding it to account and the process of 
building resilience should enhance that power.   
 
There are also concerns about short-term timeframes for action when problems are 
multifactorial, and a paradoxical push for national self-reliance when threats readily cross 
borders.33 While these concerns highlight the potential for resilience to be used as 
shorthand for a narrow preparedness agenda, we do not believe they accurately represent 
the meaning of health system resilience as intended here.  Building resilience is much 
more than preparedness; it involves investments in institutions, preconditions (like an 
effective health workforce) and other so-called “slow variables.” and requires.  We reject 
the notion that resilience calls for communities to shoulder crises alone and call instead 
for meaningful government engagement with communities to ensure responsive health 
services that people trust and want to use.13 We also agree that imposed technocratic 
solutions will not bring about needed change and that the particular arrangements needed 
to promote resilience have to emerge from the country’s context. The cases below 
highlight several of these features.  Building resilience should be integrated with existing 
efforts to strengthen health systems and its success should be judged on equitable health 
gains rather than the security of wealthy nations. 
 
Resilience in action: three case studies 
We present three case studies in which several of the authors were centrally involved, 
where a range of large health shocks have contributed to improved health system 
resilience: chronic system dysfunction aggravated by a population influx in Lebanon, 
sudden and severe outbreak shock in Liberia, and repeated, anticipated disaster shocks in 
Indonesia.   
These case studies illustrate how central real-time awareness and self-regulation are to 
resilience. Awareness is the capacity to detect and interpret local warning signs and 
quickly call on health and non-health partners for support. Liberia’s initial paralysis 
during the Ebola epidemic was in large part caused by poor understanding and 
appreciation of disease severity and spread—at all levels from local to global. Self-
regulation is the ability to isolate threats and maintain core functions under stress. While 
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Ebola Treatment Units are a classic example of self-regulation (in Liberia’s case, these 
came too late to mitigate spread), Lebanon’s emergency vaccination and surveillance 
efforts, and Indonesia’s regional crisis mitigation centers can also be seen as 
“homeostatic” innovations for containing health threats.  Indonesia’s case also shows the 
value of learning and adaptation: the crisis mitigation centers arose from experience of 
poor coordination in past tsunamis in anticipation of future similar catastrophic weather 
events.  In each of these case studies, most elements of resilience emerged after crisis 
rather than ahead of crisis.  As we note below, future research should consider how the 
elements of resilience perform when adopted ex ante. 
The value offered by diverse health care providers that can coordinate with each other is 
seen in the case of Lebanon, which is now hosting 1.8 million refugees from Syria 
increasing its population by over 30%.36 To meet the challenge of much larger numbers 
of people seeking care, the Ministry of Health has expanded the primary care base as an 
efficient approach to tackling multiple health needs of both refugees and citizens. This 
has been done in part through consultation and contracting with private sector providers, 
including faith-based providers; an example of integration among diverse health actors 
who in the past may not have worked together. 
Integration also draws attention to the key mediating role that broader state-society 
relations play during crises, including the recognition of people as producers of their 
health and thus as co-architects of an effective crisis response. Involving people and 
communities in crafting a response to health crises depends on—and is a potential means 
of strengthening—government accountability to its citizens. Stronger mechanisms for 
state-society partnerships allow government officials to weave the experience, 
expectations and capabilities of affected people into the containment strategy for a more 
powerful and empathetic response.  Identifying ways to work effectively with local 
leaders was a critical lesson from Liberia during the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic. 
Community leaders were critical forces in case finding, community mobilization, and 
other epidemic control measures.  
Measuring resilience capacity: a proposal for a Resilience Index 
Recent international panels reviewing the Ebola experience have called for measurement 
of health system resilience capacity ahead of crises.31,37,38 Building on the conceptual 
framework described earlier, we have outlined a set of preliminary measures of national 
health system resilience (Table 1).  They include existing health system and preparedness 
metrics (e.g., from the International Health Regulations, the Global Health Security 
Agenda, and the Sustainable Development Goals), relevant measures from non-health 
fields, and new proposed measures that require further development and testing.  This 
proposed Resilience Index balances slow (e.g., availability of district health staff with 
public health training) and fast (e.g., provisions to reallocate money in emergencies) 
drivers of resilience, thus bridging health system and preparedness agendas.  In contrast 
to traditional health security frameworks, many of our indicators reflect characteristics of 
“everyday” resilience; they not only encourage daily function but also proactively reduce 
the likelihood of rising system threats. The index can thus inform development of 
national health plans. It can also expose gaps in function and measurement capacity 
where regional and global cooperation can contribute.  
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The Index does not prescribe national benchmarks.  Given the heterogeneity of health 
systems and national contexts, benchmarks for resilience indicators should be set within 
countries to accommodate the local context. The next step would be to review and extend 
this list as needed, and to develop and validate indicators for the new measure constructs, 
with input from community leaders and non-health sector actors.  While the index is 
meant to be prospective (used in advance of a crisis), some proposed measures include 
routinely collected service delivery and quality indicators that over time can indicate the 
“slope” of resilience (the extent and speed with which a system returns to baseline or 
better after a shock). Finally, the validity of the Resilience Index should be tested against 
actual performance in recent health shocks in several settings. 
Conclusion 
Before the failure of health systems during the Ebola outbreak is forgotten, we need to 
consider how to make health systems more resistant to crises and more flexible in their 
response. The concept of resilience adds dynamism and urgency to the longstanding work 
of health system strengthening and provides an opportunity to learn from other sectors.  
Country experiences as varied as Lebanon, Liberia and Indonesia demonstrate how 
resilience can be built after health crises. Proposed measures of health system resilience 
can improve our assessment of countries’ progress in building resilience and indicate 
areas for action. We hope implementation of these ideas can energize policymakers and 
ultimately benefit families and communities in times of crisis and beyond. 
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Exhibits 
Box 1. Integrated approaches to care for diverse needs: working with non-state 
actors during the Syrian refugee influx in Lebanon 
 
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Lebanon has experienced an 
unprecedented influx of refugees, increasing its population by 1.5 million, or 30%. 36 The 
Syrian crisis still persists today, placing continued strain on Lebanon’s health system. 
Lebanon’s health system has demonstrated resilience by rapidly mobilizing and 
expanding its diverse primary care service delivery capacity in the public and private 
sectors. 
Initial refugee health relief focused on short-term assistance delivered via multiple 
organizations.39,40 The fragmentation of early relief efforts motivated the Ministry of 
Public Health to established a steering committee to streamline relief funding and 
encourage transparency and accountability across international and national health 
actors.41  
Primary health care grew to be the central platform for the response. In 2015, the 
Government of Lebanon and its multi-sectoral partners (including UNHCR, UNDP, 
World Bank, and NGOs) established 20 new public health centres and directly supported 
100 private health centres, increasing primary care capacity by 40%.42 Covered services 
include non-communicable disease screening, nutrition services, and mental health 
support.42,43 Additions to the epidemiological surveillance system improved the health 
system’s ability to detect emerging diseases, contributing to the country’s quick response 
to arising polio threats.44  
Despite early successes in primary care, access to Lebanon’s secondary and 
tertiary health care system continues to be a challenge for refugees.42,43 Recent estimates 
suggest that approximately 26% of the refugee population requires secondary health care, 
however 23% of those requiring secondary services are unable to access care, primarily 
due to high fees (71%). 45 Financial assistance for the costs of care is limited to specific 
conditions, and requires co-payment, which contributes to substantial financial burdens 
for refugees.42,43,46  
 
Box 2. Continuous adaptation to build awareness: Engaging and communicating 
with communities during Liberia’s Ebola crisis 
 
At the peak of the 2014 Ebola epidemic, Liberia reported 300 to 400 new Ebola 
cases each week and had the highest incidence of Ebola deaths of the affected West 
Africa nations. 47 Meanwhile, non-Ebola patients were neglected – health facilities lacked 
testing and isolation capacity and thus turned down patients who appeared sick. 48 Some 
facilities simply stopped providing services altogether.  Urban and rural communities 
resisted surveillance and disease control efforts, some believing Ebola was purposely 
introduced by the government and foreign institutions to gain profits from emergency 
response activities. 48-50 Trust was further eroded by inadequate responses from Ebola 
Task Forces and help hotlines when neighbors fell ill.49 
Gradually, Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) opened and health facilities resumed 
services. At the same time, The Ministry of Health and partner NGOs first launched a 
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series of public health messages beginning with “Ebola kills”, intended to emphasize the 
gravity of the epidemic.51 While intended to emphasize the gravity of the epidemic, this 
approach backfired. Communities reasoned that if Ebola was universally fatal, sick 
family members should avoid ETUs and instead should die at home, supported by 
family.51 Public messaging gradually evolved to messages like “the earlier you report 
Ebola, the more likely you are to survive”. Traditional leaders were enlisted to support 
community training in all 88 counties and spread messages in local dialects.52 
To improve effectiveness of the epidemic response, communities were directly 
engaged in surveillance. In West Point, Monrovia’s largest slum, community and 
traditional leaders were assembled to discuss concerns and propose a locally driven 
solution for Ebola surveillance.48,53 Community leaders were assembled to discuss 
concerns and propose locally acceptable surveillance methods for the densely populated 
area. A system for active case finding was developed. Along with psychosocial support 
workers, active case finders helped identify potential Ebola cases, reduce caregiver 
transmission, and promote burials by trained ‘safe and dignified’ burial teams. Leaders 
recruited community volunteers to complete Ministry-led surveillance training with 152 
active case finders and 15 psychosocial support workers deployed.53 
 
Box 3. Learning how to self-regulate: Coordinating multiple actors during natural 
disasters in Indonesia  
 
Spread across three major geologic fault lines, Indonesia experiences periodic 
earthquakes and tsunamis. Each recent disaster has tested the health system and led to 
progressive adaptation. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, triggered by a massive undersea 
earthquake, devastated the province of Aceh.54 Overnight, 106 health facilities in Aceh 
were damaged or destroyed and more than half the health workforce was displaced from 
their homes or killed. 55,56 Government struggled to organize a response and assistance 
was further delayed by security concerns: Aceh had been the site of recent battles 
between government and the guerilla separatist group, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 
delaying a national response and blocking NGO aid. 57,58 As aid eventually arrived, 
provision was chaotic with duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in services in 
others. It took two weeks to establish a disaster coordination centre, and nearly one 
month for the Aceh health system to resume function.  
Two years later during the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, the national response 
was remarkably different. In a show of support, the President of Indonesia temporarily 
relocated his office to Yogyakarta hours after the earthquake to support the National 
Disaster Management Agency emergency efforts.59 While 67 of 115 health centers in 
Yogyakarta were damaged or severely destroyed, domestic health teams were quickly 
mobilized to the disaster site overnight to provide emergency relief. 60,61 The response to 
this earthquake—both more efficient and more locally driven than that for the 2004 
tsunami—was informed by lessons learned from Aceh and the absence of conflict in the 
area.  
Learning from these experiences, Indonesia established nine regional crisis 
mitigation centres in 2009.62 Strategically located in disaster-prone areas, these centres 
are proactively equipped with staff, vehicles, and emergency supplies, and perform 
community outreach with local health facilities in between natural disasters, teaching 
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basic first-aid and natural disaster response. 63,64 
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Figure 1: Resilient Health System Framework 
 
 
 
Note: Figure adapted from Kruk et al 13
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global, and private actors
Works across sectors
Involves communities
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Integrated Adaptive
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regulating
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National leadership and policy | Public health and health system infrastructure | Committed workforce | Global coordination and support
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Character-
istics* 
Aims Measures Rationale 
Aware 
 
Know health 
system capacity 
1. Distribution of health system 
assets and weaknesses a 
Real-time geo-registry of HWs, supplies, and facilities (including NGOs, private, 
etc. operations) can realistically gauge available national capacities 
2. Health service utilization trends 
Routine health monitoring helps system detect service fluctuations and accurate 
assessments of crisis impact, and rate of return to baseline after a shock; 
Know risks and 
population 
3. Presence of active epidemiologic 
surveillance system a,b 
Routine surveillance is necessary to detect disease threats and trigger mitigation 
mechanisms 
4. Functioning civil registration and 
vital statistics system 
Basic knowledge on population demographics is important for estimating health 
threats and trends, and understand crisis impact 
Communicate 
5. Resilience “rolodex” of decision 
makers a 
Point persons across sectors must be immediately accessible for communication, 
decision making, and sounding alarms 
6. Breadth of functioning 
communication channels a 
Communities must be able to notify and sound alarms – this requires an 
environment of free speech and freedom of press and functioning, open platforms 
for timely communication (hotlines, community committees, social media) 
Diverse 
 
Effectively 
respond to range 
of health needs 
7. Scope of health services 
available in primary care c 
Including services that respond to population health needs and expectations in 
basic primary care package will promote routine health system utilization and 
confidence in the health system.   
8. Quality of care for sentinel 
conditions in basic package c 
Health outcomes, health care utilization during crisis, and trust in health 
authorities require competent and respectful care  
Adequately 
finance health 
system; prevent 
financial harm 
9. Financing of health care: 
adequacy of government health 
expenditure and financial 
protection c 
Total health system funding must be sufficient to support functioning services; 
financing systems should aim to reduce catastrophic and impoverishing health 
spending.  65-68  
Self-
regulating 
Isolate threat and 
maintain core 
function 
10. Memorandums of understanding 
(MOUs) with non-state  
providers 
Establishing agreement about roles for private providers –not for profit and for 
profit- in crisis expands service provision in emergencies and may promote 
collaboration in times of calm 
11. Database of service delivery 
alternatives for affected and 
unaffected populations a 
A routinely updated global, open access library of service delivery models tested 
and deemed effective in past crises promotes inter-country learning and lowers 
redundant reinvention and perpetuation of failed ideas 
Leverage outside 
capacity 
12. Collaboration agreements with 
regional and global actors 
Agreements on nature of collaboration (timing, type of support, 
roles/responsibilities) during emergencies is a form of smart dependency and 
contributes to a faster, more effective response 30 
Table 1: Preliminary Resilience Index  
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* Characteristics are inter-related and interdependent.  They should not be treated as a à la carte menu; rather decision-making and coordination should occur 
across these characteristics. 
a, b, c indicate concepts similar to proposed IHR, GHSA or SDG indicators, respectively 
Integrated 
 
Coordinate with 
non-health actors 
(e.g., education, 
transport, police, 
media, private 
enterprise) 
13. Existence of a national 
emergency coordination system 
and leader(s) a 
Ready coordination systems encourages fast decision making and 
implementation, curbing potential effects of emergencies 
14. Frequency of joint planning 
sessions and drills a 
Rehearsal of preparedness plans and regular collaboration establishes norms of 
inter-sectoral teamwork 
15. Process for development of a 
One Health strategy b 
Acknowledging human ties to the environment and other species encourages an 
inclusive understanding of public health vulnerabilities  
Engage citizens 
and communities 
to build trust 
16. Index of Ministry of Health and 
government responsiveness to 
community need 
Quick action in responding to community needs can foster population trust and 
promote containment of health shock 
17. Population trust in health system 
Trust in government and in the health system is essential to effective service 
delivery and for acceptance of government messages in crises—this is true in 
government-run and mixed provider health systems 69,70 
18. Platforms for dialogue with 
community leaders 
Regular input about health system functioning from citizens will improve 
emergency planning and establish communication channels for routine and 
emergency needs 
19. In-country social scientists with 
experience working with 
Ministry of Health 
Tapping experts in sociology, anthropology, and related disciplines strengthens 
understanding of key social structures in crisis response, local health determinants 
and the local appropriateness and acceptability of interventions.  
Link health care 
provision to 
public health 
20. Availability of district health 
staff with public health training b 
Public health staff serve to promote public health practices and act as sentinels for 
potential outbreaks connecting local clinics to surveillance and monitoring system 
Coordinate 
primary and 
referral care 
21. Agreement on roles and referral 
protocols for facilities 
Defined agreements on role of primary and referral facilities reduce confusion and 
service delay; streamlines service delivery for patients 
Adaptive 
Shift resources to 
meet need 
22. Formal provisions to reallocate 
funds in emergency 
Flexible spending of funds—national and international—speeds up and better 
targets emergency response in fast changing situations 
Promote rapid 
local decision 
making 
23. Management capacity of 
district/local health teams c 
For decentralized responses, local health teams must be able to interpret local data 
and local leaders must be able to make quick and sound operational decisions  
24. Agreements on delegation of 
authority and funding in crises 
Pre-crisis agreements permitting local decision making in crisis with sufficient 
support hasten response time to evolving challenges  
Evaluate to 
improve 
25. Mechanisms for and capacity to 
track progress and evaluate 
health system performance in 
crisis and in times of calmb 
Rigorous monitoring during crisis and independent evaluation post-crisis permits 
course-correction and points to needed reforms.  National capacity for data use 
and, more broadly, a culture of open inquiry and evaluation need to be built in 
times of calm to deliver during a crisis. 
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